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Maybe what is really important for our modernity—that is, for our 
present—is not so much the statization [étatisation] of society, as the 
“governmentalization” of the state.1 
 
[I]f that collective force, the State, is to be the liberator of the individual, 
it has itself need of some counter-balance; it must be restrained by other 
collective forces . . . . It is not a good thing for the groups to stand alone, 
nevertheless they have to exist. And it is out of this conflict of social 
forces that individual liberties are born.2 
 
I.  BEYOND THE STATE 
 
In a story that does not lose its appeal merely because it is apocryphal, the 
adolescent Luis Buñuel tries to convince his friend to go pee with him at the altar 
in their staunchly catholic village. The friend says no. “Come on, let’s pee on the 
altar,” says Buñuel. No, says the friend. “What’s the matter?” insists Buñuel. “Are 
you a coward? Are you afraid of the priest? Are you afraid of God’s wrath?” The 
friend says no. “Then why won’t you pee on the altar?” “I have no need to pee at 
the altar,” replies the friend. “I do not believe in God.”  
The fascination with non-state governance reminds me of this story. The 
debate about global governance and the corresponding role of the state has had its 
fair share of altar-peeing and offered challenges (sometimes adolescent, sometimes 
brilliant) to the state’s overarching authority. Some of this work has been 
pathbreaking—as have, of course, the films of Buñuel, who has certainly been 
more influential than his apocryphal friend. But in the end, Buñuel’s filmmaking 
always displayed, in its strongest atheist provocations, a deep ultimate faith, so 
nicely expressed in Buñuel’s famous quote that he is “still an atheist, thank God.”3 
The same is true with much of the state-opposing and state-denying literature in 
globalization. Its greatest weakness is that, by putting the object of its opposition 
and its denial at the center of analysis, it cannot escape it. 
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This is not for lack of trying. During the heyday of globalization discourse, in 
the 1990s, there was much talk of a “decline of the state,”4 which in turn spurred 
an intense search for alternatives to state law and state-based government. Non-
state governance was suddenly chic. Markets, corporations, industries, religious 
communities, ethnic communities, Internet users—diverse groups of all kinds—
were praised (or damned) for their ability to self-govern without interference from 
the state. After the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the bailout of the financial 
system, some of this excitement has decreased, and now we are said to be 
witnessing a return of the state, of some sorts.5 If global capital markets once 
served as the most impressive example of extensive governance structures 
allegedly outside the state—with private regulators in the Basle Committee, private 
rule-makers in corporate law offices6—then the massive bailout reactions by 
governments after the collapse of the financial system reminded everyone of the 
remaining central position of the state. As a consequence, “non-state governance” 
sounds outdated again. 
The problem is not just the rise and fall of the non-state in parallel with the 
fall and rise of the state in the world. A bigger problem in discussions over the rise 
and fall of the relative position of the state in the world, as well as with discussions 
over the “proper mix” of public and private governance structures, is that the core 
elements—the state, public, and private governance—are abstract entities taken to 
be constant over space and time. Is “the state” always the same over time and 
space? What exactly is the difference between public and private governance? 
Issues of method—whether the state still presents the paradigm of our research into 
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governance—are intermingled with matters of history, i.e., what role “the state” 
actually plays in the world.7 
But the biggest problem is, why does all of this matter? Simply put, do we not 
care more about good versus bad governance than we care about state versus non-
state governance? And if we do, is the difference state/non-state or the difference 
public/private really the prime criterion by which to assess governance? 
The state has long been the most important political myth to determine and 
constrain our political thinking.8 Yet non-state governance is, if anything, more, 
not less, mythical: an ideologically laden concept, a romantic idea. It looks 
attractive to those who oppose the state—free market proponents on the political 
right, advocates for local indigenous communities on the left. But from this 
perspective, the idea of non-state law and non-state governance appears rather 
antiquated. Of course, the broadened focus on non-state structures is crucial, and 
any attempt, in legal studies as well as in political science, to integrate such 
traditionally neglected structures is to be welcomed. However, non-state is the 
false perspective for these phenomena. Non-state governance is a mirage, a mere 
mirror image of the state—its opposite or its copy. Instead of overcoming the state, 
the perspective on non-state governance essentializes the state. If we want to 
overcome our traditional focus on the state, we must overcome our focus on the 
non-state, too. Instead of the formal and artificial differentiation state/non-state, we 
should look for functional differentiations between different modes of governance. 
In this Essay, I offer three theses, all of which are critical. First, non-state 
governance is conceptually unattractive; it is a concept that makes little sense.9 
Second, non-state governance is empirically unattractive; meaningful non-state 
governance rarely exists.10 Third, meaningful non-state governance is normatively 
unattractive; we would rarely want it, and people postulating it usually expect the 
state to play an important role.11 However, I also have something constructive: a 
proposed trajectory. Talk about the state and the non-state can only be an 
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intermediary stage in a trajectory of a theory of governance that might lead to a 
new paradigm of governance. This trajectory would move from state centralism via 
a state/non-state dichotomy and a state/non-state hybridity toward a new paradigm 
of governance beyond the state.12 
 
II.  CONCEPTS 
 
What exactly is meant by non-state governance? It makes sense to start with 
governance, a notoriously unclear term, though not an entirely useless one. Current 
usage of the term emerges from the search in the 1970s and 1980s for a broader 
concept than that of government, which was seen to be too focused on the state.13 
Such a broader concept appeared necessary for empirical and normative reasons. 
Empirically, it had become clear that traditional ideas about regulation that focused 
on direct state regulation were not working, a situation sometimes referred to as the 
crisis of governability.14 Normatively, it seemed desirable to focus on broader 
reforms than merely those of state institutions in order to bring about change and 
progress. Governance thus provided an alternative to government in the sense that 
it was more encompassing: it included non-state actors in addition to state actors, 
and it included additional tools to that of top-down regulation. 
The term governance, however, is as old as government. The roots of both 
terms lie in Greek (κυβερνήτης) and Latin (gubernare); usage in English goes back 
to at least Chaucer, as evidenced by the Oxford English Dictionary.15 More 
important, both governance and government were long used interchangeably, 
because government meant largely what we today refer to as governance. Foucault, 
in his lecture on governmentality, reminds us that the virulent debates in the 
sixteenth century on “good government” were not at all confined to state 
government, but concerned all aspects of public and private life: 
 
One has, for example, the question of the government of oneself, 
that ritualization of the problem of personal conduct characteristic of the 
sixteenth century Stoic revival. There is the problem too of the 
government of souls and lives, the entire theme of Catholic and 
Protestant pastoral doctrine. There is government of children and the 
great problematic of pedagogy that emerges and develops during the 
sixteenth century. And, perhaps only as the last of these questions to be 
taken up, there is the government of the state by the prince.16 
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In other words, neither governance nor government was confined in any 
particular way to the state. Only with the rise of the nation-state as an organizing 
concept of politics and of society did a hierarchical system emerge, and the state 
maintained an important stage at the top of the hierarchy of different governments 
(“the last of these questions to be taken up”): self-government (morality), family 
government (or economy, in the old sense of oiko-nomia, literally house[hold] 
administration), and state government (politics).17 
Notably, this hierarchy, established in political theory, mirrors the hierarchy 
established in the legal theory of natural law system. A famous example is the 
hierarchy of laws established by Pufendorf, which also runs up from the individual 
(law of persons) via family law to state law.18 Just as government was not confined 
to the state for sixteenth century political theory, likewise, law was not confined to 
state law for the natural law tradition.19 
This has, of course, changed dramatically. Foucault describes the struggle in 
the seventeenth century to establish the economy within the (state) governmental 
sphere, and it did not take long until the individual level, including morality, also 
came to be viewed as a function of state government.20 In fact, the detailed rules in 
the Prussian Civil Code on such seemingly private matters as how often a mother 
should nurse her child21 were possible because the Code was based on Pufendorf’s 
hierarchical system.22 Simultaneously, law was more and more connected to the 
emerging nation state—first public law (as the idea, quite radical at first, that the 
government should be bound by rules),23 later private law.24 When Justice Holmes, 
in 1917, derided the idea of a law that transcends political authority as “a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky,”25 law had become necessarily tied to a political entity, 
and that entity could at the time be only the state. This is, in a nutshell, how we 
have come to think of both government and law as tied to the state—as the 
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consequence of convergent developments in politics (the rise of the nation state), 
ideology (the desire to delegitimize authority outside the government, a continuous 
theme between absolutism and representative democracy) and theory. From this 
perspective, the introduction of governance beyond the state is not a revolution, but 
a counterrevolution, directed against the revolutionary redefinition of government 
as exclusively resting in the state. 
However, the idea of governance does not fully turn back the clock; it 
remains, in its contemporary emanations, defined by its relation to state 
government. Governance is what the state does, even if other groups do it, too. 
Non-state governance is what these other groups and institutions do like the state, 
just minus the state. Consider, for example, the variety described in Stewart 
Macaulay’s important essay on private government: 
 
If governing involves making rules, interpreting them, applying 
them to specific cases, and sanctioning violations, some of [recte: or] all 
of this is done by such different clusters of people as the Mafia, the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, the American Arbitration 
Association, those who run large shopping centers, neighborhood 
associations, and even the regulars at Smokey’s tavern.26 
 
True, interesting, and important. But nothing, it appears, holds these groups 
together apart from a characteristic they share—making rules, etc.—that is 
borrowed from the state, and from a negative quality they have: they are not the 
state. We should pay more attention to these groups, but it is unclear how any 
comprehensive concept of governance can leave the state out while keeping 
everything else in. Whatever these groups are doing, it seems, is defined by what 
the state does. 
The problem thus described—that non-state governance, far from being 
independent from the state, is defined by it—is enhanced by another finding. “The 
state” (and thus the non-state) is an abstract entity, abstracted both from the 
institutions that it combines and from the great variation of actual states we find 
over space and time. This abstraction is to some degree justified, even necessary, 
in law, especially where, as in continental European thinking, the state is often 
equated with the law.27 It also correlates, at least in the past, to popular ideas of 
common identity28 and in findings of relatively great value coherence within 
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MOMENT’S NOTICE: TIME POLITICS ACROSS CULTURES 56–60 (1996) (emphasizing the 
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states.29 Beyond this, the abstract idea of the state is deeply problematic in social 
scientific research of governance. Over space, the similar treatment of big Western 
states and small postcolonial states as “states” is at best unhelpful. Over time, the 
ever-changing nature of the state has been an important factor in its longevity. 
Saskia Sassen has rightly emphasized that globalization is not an occurrence 
outside the state but instead that the state is an active participant in it and in its own 
transformation.30 As a consequence, the state under conditions of globalization is 
different from the state prior to globalization, and any category of non-state 
governance must be updated constantly to take account of this changing character. 
It may thus be that certain new governance institutions are incompatible with the 
traditional states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but this suggests only 
that we should leave those traditional ideas of the state behind, not the state 
altogether. 
 
III.  EMPIRICS 
 
The conceptual unattractiveness of non-state governance as a purely negative 
category is enhanced by the empirical insight that real non-state governance—
governance in the absence of a state—may indeed exist, but it is exceedingly 
rare.31 Almost all governance combines public and private, or governmental and 
non-governmental, aspects. This is hardly ever denied, but it is often forgotten. The 
starkest example is the incessant invocation of a lex mercatoria as an alleged self-
made and autonomous law of international trade, created and administered by 
merchants (and their lawyers) in the absence of the state. Once a topic mainly for 
lawyers, lex mercatoria is now increasingly being discussed in the social sciences, 
too.32 But the autonomous lex mercatoria is a myth, both in its ancient and in its 
                                                 
29  See GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES, 
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS passim  (2d ed. 2001). 
30  See, e.g., SASKIA SASSEN, A SOCIOLOGY OF GLOBALIZATION 46 (Jeffrey C. 
Alexander ed., 2007): 
 
[F]ar from being mutually exclusive, the state is one of the strategic institutional 
domains in which critical work on the development of globalization takes place. 
. . . The state becomes the site for foundational transformations in the 
relationship between the private and the public domains, in the state’s internal 
balance of power, and in the larger field of both national and global forces 
within which the state now has to function.  
 
See also Clyde W. Barrow, The Return of the State: Globalization, State Theory, and the 
New Imperialism, 27 NEW POL. SCI. 123, 125 (2005) (arguing that the state has rebounded 
in the form of American Empire). 
31  It is worth pointing out that the opposite is also true. Pure state governance in the 
absence of other institutions involved in the governance does not exist, either. This insight, 
hardly counterintuitive, was what led to the shift from government to governance discussed 
before. 
32  See generally A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY: 
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modern form.33 The purported autonomous and trans-European commercial law of 
the middle ages consisted, at best, of procedural rules; substantive commercial law 
rules were built on those of the European common law, sometimes referred to as 
the mother of the law merchant.34 The contemporary lex mercatoria combines 
rules from domestic and international law with those emerging in commerce; 
institutionally, the need to enforce arbitral awards and the possibility to nullify 
them in state court are evidence not of the autonomy of lex mercatoria but instead 
of the entwinement between transnational commerce and the state.35 Participants in 
global commerce seem to have no interest in an autonomous non-state law, and 
why would they? They pick and choose between state and non-state laws and 
institutions on the basis of functionality.36 Lex mercatoria as non-state law is a 
myth. 
This insight applies not only to lex mercatoria but also to various other 
alleged sites of non-state governance. The self-regulation of corporations comes 
with the strong protection and enforcement of the state with its law; the internal 
affairs doctrine is just that—not a social reality of self-governance, but instead a 
rule of state law necessary for corporate self-governance. The self-regulation of 
industries is often a way to stave off or to replicate state regulation.37 Early 
fantasies of an autonomous Internet with its own legal order have given way to 
realization of the role played by detailed regulation by the state.38 Global Islam 
                                                                                                                            
TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY passim (2003) 
(offering a critical analysis of the role international economic law plays in creating and 
maintaining of global power relations); Alec Stone Sweet, The New Lex Mercatoria and 
Transnational Governance, 13 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 627 passim (2006) (discussing how the 
transnational business community has evolved and uses “‘a-national’ principles of contract 
and a system of private ‘courts’ to organize and regulate cross-border commercial 
exchange”). 
33  See Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL. STUD. 447, 452–60 (2007). 
34  See Albrecht Cordes, The Search for a Medieval Lex Mercatoria, OXFORD U. 
COMP. L. F. (2003), http://ouclf.iuscomp.org/articles/cordes.shtml, text accompanying nn. 
11, 12, & 13; Charles Donahue, Jr., Medieval and Early Modern Lex Mercatoria: An 
Attempt at the Probatio Diabolica, 5 CHI. J. INT’L L. 21, 27–29 (2004); Jansen & Michaels, 
supra note 19, at 368; Oliver Volckart & Antje Mangels, Are the Roots of the Modern Lex 
Mercatoria Really Medieval?, 65 S. ECON. J. 427, 446–47 (1999). 
35  See Julian D.M. Lew, Achieving the Dream: Autonomous Arbitration, 22 ARB. 
INT’L 179, passim (2006). 
36  Michaels, supra note 33, at 462–64. 
37  Jürgen Basedow, The State’s Private Law and the Economy—Commercial Law as 
an Amalgam of Public and Private Rule-Making, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 703, 711–12 (2008). 
Here, as elsewhere, the impact goes both ways: as the state influences business, so business 
influences the state. See Gregory Shaffer, How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal 
Framework, 42 CONN. L. REV. 147, 169–72 (2009). 
38  See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 10 (2006). The insight of the state’s continuing control over Internet 
governance is older. See James Boyle, Foucault in Cyberspace: Surveillance, Sovereignty 
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may look like a powerful non-state network, but in reality it is so intimately linked 
with existing states that claiming it as non-state governance would be bold.39 
Religious groups in the United States enjoy a large degree of autonomy from the 
state and consequent freedom to self-regulate, but the basis for this autonomy, at 
least from the perspective of the state, is the First Amendment, and the boundaries 
of the autonomy are a matter of adjudication in secular courts. The Catholic 
Church, far from being a non-state institution, has even been characterized as the 
precursor to the first modern Western state.40 The allegedly autochthonous non-
state legal orders in colonies have been shown to be largely constructs by and for 
the purpose of the colonizing state.41 
Actually, we find real non-state governance only in areas where no 
functioning state exists, and there are few such areas in our world of states. One 
candidate is local communities that remain untouched by civilization; but even 
here the state is anything but absent. Take the news of the uncontacted tribe found 
in the Amazon jungle in Brazil in 2008.42 That tribe is nowhere autonomous from 
the state; quite the contrary, the very reason we have pictures of the tribe is that the 
Brazilian government department for Indian affairs (together with non-
governmental organizations) uses them to advocate their position in the ongoing 
struggle over land rights in Brazil.43 Autonomy from the state is a direct 
consequence of protection by the state. Another example is governance in failed 
states—Taliban in Afghanistan, terrorists in Somalia, the Mafia in Sicily. Here we 
may be able to speak of non-state governance simply because no effective state 
exists (although the actual role of the respective state in the protection of these 
groups, especially in Afghanistan and Somalia, is not irrelevant). But even this is 
not governance independent from the state; it is governance enabled by the absence 
of a state that can hardly yield generalizable insights. 
One might argue that governance without the state must be possible because 
governance existed prior to the modern state.44 But the fact that governance 
                                                                                                                            
and Hardwired Censors, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 177, 178 (1997) (“[T]he conceptual structure 
and jurisprudential assumptions of digital libertarianism lead its practitioners to ignore the 
ways in which the state can often use privatized enforcement and state-backed technologies 
to evade some of the supposed practical (and constitutional) restraints on the exercise of 
legal power over the Internet.”). 
39  See CLARK BENNER LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT 1 
(2006) (explaining that Muslim nations incorporate the law of Islam into their state 
constitutions). Another issue is the Islamic theory of the (Islamic) state itself and of the 
ummah. 
40  HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN 
LEGAL TRADITION 113–15 (1983). 
41  See Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 245–
46 (2009) with references. 
42  Isolated Tribe Spotted in Brazil, BBC NEWS, May 30, 2008, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7426794.stm. 
43  Id. 
44 See Fernanda Pirie, Law Before Government: Ideology and Aspiration, 30 OX. J. 
LEGAL STUD. 207 (2010).  
40 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 1 
without a state was possible in a world without states has few direct implications 
for a world with states.45 Macaulay’s article on “private government” demonstrates 
this point. The entire article is devoted to the question of how private governance 
relates to that of the state—whether it stands in harmony or conflict with it,46 to 
what extent structures of private governance are an impediment to effective state 
regulation,47 whether private governance can fulfill the role traditionally reserved 
for state law in different social theories,48 and whether private governance can 
fulfill the legitimacy criteria traditionally used for the state.49 In other words, in an 
article ostentatiously devoted to private governance, Macaulay displays an almost 
obsessive focus on the state. He himself hastens to add that a sharp line between 
public and private governments such as these cannot be drawn.50 But then his 
analysis becomes murky. When he advocates “a ‘private government perspective’ 
which both recognizes private associations that affect government and also treats 
distinctions between public and private spheres as doubtful rather than as given,”51 
he manages, in one sentence, to proclaim the need of a distinction between a public 
and a private perspective, and the impossibility of that very distinction. We need a 
private perspective, he seems to be saying, precisely because the private cannot be 
distinguished from the public. We need to isolate non-state governance because we 
cannot separate it from state government. 
Although state governance and non-state governance rarely exist in isolation, 
this does not mean that they are similar. Quite the contrary: if almost all 
governance is a mix between private and public—or state and non-state—
governance, the relative distribution of labor between state and non-state is not 
random. The state has strategic advantages: “a technical administrative capacity 
that cannot be replicated at this time by any other institutional arrangement[,] . . . 
military power, which for some states is global power,” as well as unmatched 
financial means to save an ailing financial system,52 as we know after the bailout. 
At the same time, the state still faces strategic disadvantages: relative immobility 
                                                 
45  See Simon Roberts, After Government? On Representing Law Without the State, 68 
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of regulation of international commerce in medieval societies). 
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50  Id. 
51  Id. at 446; see also id. at 449 (“[A] private government perspective requires that we 
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and locality, transparency of decision making, and the ensuing relative 
inflexibility. Legally the state combines advantages—its rules are generally 
hierarchically superior to privately made rules like contracts, and the state 
maintains the monopoly of violence to enforce its laws—and disadvantages; it is 
bound to a Constitution, unlike private actors. Effective governance aims at 
combining the advantages of the state with the advantages of the respective private 
groups and institutions. Private actors find it attractive to invoke the state for 
enforcement because of its monopoly of power. The state, by contrast, sometimes 
finds it attractive to outsource certain state functions to escape scrutiny. The fact 
that private groups rely on the state for the enforcement of private rights is a well-
known argument against the idea of an autonomous private sphere.53 By contrast, 
the outsourcing of state functions like military functions suggests that privatization 
is not just the release of power from the state to the private realm; it is at least as 
much a strategic move by the state and thus an explicit state government policy, 
the privatization of the state by the state.54 
Often then, questions as to non-state governance are really questions about a 
particular form of state governance, namely that of deference.55 For example, when 
we ask whether it is appropriate to limit freedoms, such as speech, religion and 
association, if members of non-state communities are at risk, we ask not about 
these groups’ autonomous governance but about the state’s role in it, because it is 
the state that would limit these freedoms, and it is usually the state that we ask to 
prevent such limitations. The question whether the state should interfere in the 
self-governance of a religious group engaged in discrimination against its female 
members is not a question about state governance versus non-state governance; it 
is a question as to one kind of state governance (enforce the woman’s claim to 
non-discrimination) versus another (enforce the group’s right to self-
determination).56 The problem in the debate is not whether “we” should assign a 
greater role to non-state institutions; the problem is that the “we” almost invariably 
refers to the state and its policies. 
This suggests that it is not enough to replace the state/non-state dichotomy 
with an unspecified hybridity. To say that all governance is somehow 
public/private is trivial. To dig deeper, we would have to analyze the specifics and 
modalities of this hybridity—the modes, processes, and institutions that enable a 
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fruitful cooperation between state and non-state groups. In what specific way is 
governance shared among institutions, some belonging to the state and some not? 
What are the exact hierarchies between these institutions? Are they in conflict or in 
consensus? Etc. 
 
IV.  LEGITIMACY 
 
Such closer analyses are not merely analytical and empirical, they also have a 
normative dimension. If the debate on non-state governance were confined to 
Taliban and Mafia, we would probably not hesitate to condemn it. Instead, 
however, non-state governance is praised as superior to state government in a 
variety of areas. Religious groups should be left alone from state intervention; 
markets can best regulate themselves; codes of conduct developed by corporate 
actors are more fine-tuned and more appropriate than state regulation; indigenous 
populations should be allowed to devise their own norms instead of having to 
adopt official state norms, etc. This raises a normative question. Regardless of 
conceptual and empirical problems, would non-state governance actually be 
desirable, and under what conditions? Is state governance desirable? Or what 
public-private combination would be legitimate? 
Such questions have become popular, but they are far too general and broad to 
yield any meaningful answers—the non-category of the non-state does not allow 
for any but the most general assessments. The question whether non-state 
governance is legitimate or not cannot be answered in the abstract, just as the 
question what kinds of governance actions are legitimate cannot be answered in the 
abstract. More important, even whether such governance is instituted or 
administered by the state or by other groups is a criterion of very limited relevance 
for questions of legitimacy. Of course, there are some specific legitimacy criteria 
for state action, and there are other legitimacy criteria for non-state action. For 
example, state action must comply with certain constitutional requirements from 
which private action is free, while private action must comply with state law while 
the state can change sub-constitutional law. But these legal standards of legitimacy 
are extremely contingent. They were created at a particular point in time for a 
particular constellation of state and society, and as this constellation changes, such 
legitimacy standards may change as well. The more deterritorialized the economy 
becomes, the more willing we are to consider extraterritorial regulation by the state 
justified.57 The less able the state becomes to provide proper frameworks for 
corporate governance, the more legitimate private concepts become. In the United 
States, private enforcement of product standards (through tort actions) may be 
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more justified than in Europe simply because state institutions other than courts are 
less successful at regulating such standards in the United States.58 
Nonetheless, what we can see in the debate is how the state and our 
experience with it permeate much of the debate.59 Thus, on the one hand, we see 
attempts to replicate the legitimacy strategies within the state, to ask how non-state 
governance can be similar to the state, for example how to constitutionalize the 
private sphere. However, given that state constitutionalization took place in a very 
specific constellation—that of the state—it is neither clear that it can be achieved 
in the private sphere, nor certain that, if it can be achieved, it confers the same 
legitimacy to the non-state group as does the constitution to the state. More 
promising are attempts to show how non-state mechanisms are superior to the state 
insofar as they avoid its shortcomings.60 However, not infrequently these 
mechanisms cannot fulfill these functions, while at the same time they weaken the 
state.61 
The methodological problem is the same here as elsewhere: the state is used 
as a benchmark. In one, it provides the criteria of legitimacy; in the other, it 
provides what we want to get away from. Yet it is not clear why criteria of 
legitimacy developed within one particular global constellation—that of the nation 
state of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—should be applicable to a twenty-
first-century world. There is no doubt that our criteria of legitimacy must be 
informed by our experience with and in the state. But it also cannot be doubtful 
that these criteria must be dislodged from the nation state. In the public sphere, we 
see this in debates on the legitimacy of the European Union, which, because it is 
not a state, is now increasingly (and rightly) being judged with criteria other than 
those against which nation states are held.62 
 
V.  BEYOND THE NON-STATE 
 
Many disciplines—political science, sociology, international relations, law—
have too long been focused exclusively on the state. The attention currently given 
in these disciplines to different emanations of non-state governance is a welcome 
development insofar as it broadens our field of study by requiring us to develop 
more general theories of governance. These theories, however, will not make 
significant progress unless they help us leave our focus on the state behind. To 
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focus on the non-state as a category will not help us in this endeavor. What needs 
to be done is to put the state in perspective in order to overcome it. 
A first step is to deny the state its point at the top of the hierarchy. I pointed 
out earlier the parallel hierarchies between French government studies and 
Pufendorf’s natural law system, both of which move from the individual upward to 
the state.63 Yet, the parallel is not complete. The state is the peak of the hierarchy 
only for the authors that Foucault discusses—and, ultimately, also for Foucault 
himself, who does not address the supranational and international realms.64 For 
Pufendorf, by contrast, the state is merely one level in the hierarchy below the 
higher level of international law.65 His system of law was not particularly focused 
on the state; the state had only one of several functions to play in it.66 Granted, the 
state later achieved a more central position, as Foucault shows, that justified, for 
the time being, a focus on the “governmentalization” of the state. As such, it was 
long central also for an “internationalized world.”67 But this may be changing. 
A more important step concerns the very hierarchy of levels. If it is correct 
that we are observing a move in the world from a political segmentary 
differentiation along state borders toward a functional differentiation along 
different societal groups, then this suggests that the methodologically central 
position of the state is wavering, too.68 Note that in a world that shifts from 
territoriality to functionality, the territorial state does not automatically lose its 
role, but it must now justify that role on functional grounds. 
A trajectory of theoretical accounts of governance should enable us to 
overcome this focus on the state. We have already left behind a first stage of this 
trajectory, namely the exclusive focus on the state, something that is sometimes 
called methodological nationalism.69 The idea of non-state governance suggests a 
second stage, that of a dichotomy of state and non-state, including the possibility 
of hybridity. However, as I have argued, this is not a very fruitful stage, so a third 
stage will be a more specific analysis of the particular modes and structures of that 
hybridity, or of the particular mix of public and private governance. This makes it 
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possible, at last, to deny the state its central position in the analysis and to develop, 
on a fourth level, a governance theory beyond the state. On that level, the state’s 
institutions exist on an equal level, analytically, with non-state institutions. 
Postulating non-state governance challenges the state’s monopoly on the 
creation and adjudication of law, but it does not challenge the framework in which 
we think of governance, or government, as related and linked to the state. Non-
state governance is merely the flipside of a state government. Ironically, such a 
conception does not weaken the importance of the state for governance, but 
perpetuates it. It changes the state from a tacit background assumption to the prime 
criterion with which we differentiate between kinds of governance. This limits in 
crucial ways our ability to think creatively about governance. When we talk of 
non-state governance, we imagine governance that either reproduces the way in 
which we know law from the state, or provides its counterpart. A governance 
concept that transcends the distinction between state and non-state laws, by 
contrast, should enable us truly to imagine governance not only outside the state, 
but outside even the dichotomy of state/non-state, outside the state framework 
altogether. Non-state governance may once have been a necessary concept to 
overcome the idea that all law is state law. However, as the mere negation of that 
idea, it lacks constructive potential; its implications collapse into either the 
negation or the replication of law within the state. We should leave this behind and 
devote our attention to a governance concept that transcends these boundaries and 
presents a more credible candidate for globalization and a functionally 
differentiated global system: governance beyond the state. 
 
